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The main purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence on the effects of the cigarette excise
tax structure on three outcomes: cigarette prices, government revenues, and cigarette consumption.
We composed cross-sectional time-series data for 21 EU countries from year 1998 to 2007 from various
data resources.  We provide strong evidence that the price gap between premium and low-priced brands
is larger in countries with a greater share of ad valorem tax. A 10-percent raise in the share of ad valorem
tax in total excise tax leads to about a 4 to 5 percent increase in the price gap, with a smaller impact
in more concentrated markets.  Our estimates confirm that greater instability of government tax revenues
from cigarette excise taxes can be attributed to greater reliance on the ad valorem tax and such instability
increases with the growth of manufacturers’ market power.  We also find that greater reliance on a
specific tax has greater impact on cigarette smoking, but the impact diminishes with the growth of
manufacturers’ market power.
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I. Introduction 
Tobacco taxes are the most cost effective tobacco control measure for promoting 
smoking cessation, preventing initiation, and reducing consumption.  More than 100 
studies from industrialized countries produce consistent evidence that shows that the 
higher prices that result from increased tax lead to significant reductions in cigarette 
smoking.  Most of these studies produce estimates for the price elasticity of demand in 
the range from -0.25 to -0.50, implying that a 10% increase in the price of cigarettes will 
reduce overall cigarette consumption by between 2.5% and 5.0% (Chaloupka and 
Warner, 2000; Chaloupka et al., 2000).    A growing number of studies from low and 
middle income countries suggest that the same price increase will produce even larger 
reductions in consumption (Ross and Chaloupka, 2006). 
Governments impose a variety of taxes on tobacco products, with excise taxes levied 
by most countries globally.    The two major excises are specific excise taxes (those 
imposed based on quantity or product characteristics) and ad valorem excise taxes (those 
imposed based on value). Worldwide, out of 167 countries for which data are available, 
60 countries rely solely on specific taxation, 60 on ad valorem, and 48 of them use a 
combination of both (the majority of them being in Europe); 19 countries impose no 
excise tax on cigarettes (WHO, 2010).     
Given the inelastic demand for tobacco products and the low share of taxes in retail 
prices in most countries, increases in tobacco taxes produce sustainable and higher 
revenues for the governments. However, the two types of excises can differentially affect   2 
prices, revenues and the quality and variety of products available and, as a result, 
smoking behavior and its consequences (Sunley et al., 2000; WHO, 2010).    The choice 
between specific and ad valorem taxes depends on a government’s priorities.   
All European Union countries impose both specific and ad valorem excise taxes 
on cigarettes. According to the current European Union council directive (2002/10/CE), 
each member state should apply an overall minimum tax (specific tax + ad valorem tax) 
of EUR 64 per 1,000 cigarettes for cigarettes of the price category most in demand.  
Moreover, the minimum level of total tax should be 57% of retail price (inclusive of all 
taxes) for cigarettes of the price category most in demand.               
  While many factors affect the final price of cigarettes, the most important 
policy-related determinants of tobacco prices are taxes on tobacco products. Tobacco 
taxes provide significant revenue to governments with relatively low administrative costs 
making tobacco taxes appealing, especially during periods of budget shortfalls. 
Moreover, higher tobacco taxes are effective in reducing tobacco consumption and 
thereby improving public health. The ability to increase revenues and improve public 
health has made tobacco tax increases a popular policy lever to pull in recent decades.   
    However, a longstanding debate exists in Europe regarding the harmonization of 
cigarette taxes with southern European countries predominantly favoring ad valorem 
taxation and northern European countries predominantly favoring a more specific tax 
structure (Delipalla and O’Donnell, 2001; Antonanzas and Rodriguez, 2007). The 
different tax structures emerge primarily because each country has different fiscal policy   3 
objectives with some countries focused more on economic goals and others motivated by 
public health and other objectives. The difference in preferred tax structure has hampered 
an agreement on harmonization of taxes among EU countries. Evidence on the impacts of 
these two types of taxes on cigarette prices, government revenue, and cigarette 
consumption will help inform the tax structure debate.            
  This paper attempts to inform policy makers on the impact of cigarette tax structure 
on the three aforementioned outcomes. We hypothesize that countries that rely more 
heavily on ad valorem taxes than specific taxes will have a greater variation in price 
between high- and low-priced brands. To the extent that a stronger reliance on ad valorem 
tax provides a price advantage to lower-priced domestic brands compared to more 
expensive international brands, countries that have a stake in manufacturing and 
distributing tobacco would likely prefer ad valorem taxes to specific taxes if one 
objective of these taxes is to favor domestic production. We also hypothesize that the 
cigarette tax structure will affect the variability of revenue streams over time with 
countries that have a greater reliance on ad valorem taxes having greater variability in 
revenue streams than countries that rely more heavily on specific taxes due to industry 
initiated price changes. Recent evidence from Spain supports this hypothesis. In 2006, 
Spain which relies heavily on ad valorem taxes, raised its tobacco tax and witnessed a fall 
in tobacco revenues. The unexpected fall in revenues was due to the tobacco producers 
reducing the price of their products (Antonanzas and Rodriguez, 2007). Finally, we 
hypothesize that the cigarette tax structure will have an impact on overall cigarette   4 
consumption. Specifically, we hypothesize that overall cigarette consumption will be less 
affected by tax increases in countries that rely more heavily on ad valorem taxes than 
specific taxes. If as hypothesized above, countries that rely more heavily on ad valorem 
taxes will have a greater variation in price between high- and low-priced brands, then 
smokers in heavier ad valorem tax environments will have greater opportunities to switch 
down to lower-priced discount brands and thus decrease their overall consumption less 
than smokers in relatively lower ad valorem environments. This paper will test the above 
mentioned hypotheses using cross-sectional time-series data for twenty-one European 




  Much of the difference in behavioral effects between ad valorem and specific excise 
taxes arises because tobacco products are typically available in a wide range of quality 
grades.    Thus taxes affect consumer decisions about quality and quantity.    A higher tax 
may lead consumers to reduce both the quality and the quantity of the cigarettes 
consumed.    The consumer's decision to lower quality in response to higher taxes is 
sometimes referred to as "quality shading". Because of quality shading, specific excise 
taxes are a more preferred tobacco control instrument than ad valorem taxes for the 
purposes of tobacco control.     
    If there are just high quality and low quality cigarettes, then the overall quantity, Q 
is the sum of low and high quality cigarettes:   5 
      12 Q=QQ  
If the same specific excise tax  T is imposed on both high and low quality cigarettes, the 
total revenue collected is   
      12 Tax Revenue =  ( ) T Q Q  
Tax revenue depends on the total amount, high and low quality, purchased and not on the 
mix between high and low quality cigarettes.    While changes in total quantity can affect 
revenue, with a uniform specific excise tax, quality shading has no effect on tax revenue 
when total quantity remains constant; this is not true for ad valorem taxes.    Specific 
excise taxes also allow tobacco producers less scope to manipulate tax revenues by 
altering relative prices.   
  For an ad valorem tax, total amount collected is   
      1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 Tax Revenue ( ) ( ( )) t PQ PQ t PQ P Q Q  
Here, changes in the quality mix alters the amount of revenue, even if total quantity, Q, 
remains constant:    A one unit increase in  1 Q , holding  Qconstant, causes revenue to 
decline by  12 () t P P .    If producers alter the mix of prices,  1 P   and 2 P   , causing 
quantities  1 Q and  2 Q   to change,    tax revenue can vary, even if total quantity remains 
unchanged.    Our hypothesis that revenues will exhibit more variability with ad valorem 
taxes stems from this observation.   
  An important determinant of the demand for one good versus another good is relative 
price, that is, the ratio  21 / PP , the price of high quality cigarettes relative to the price of 
low quality cigarettes. The effect on relative prices considered here is similar to effect   6 
studied in the "shipping the good apples out" (Hummel and Skiba, 2004).    Ad valorem 
and specific excise taxes have very different effects on relative prices.      If the same 
specific excise tax T is imposed on high and low quality cigarettes, the relative price falls 
and becomes   
      21 ( )/( ) P T P T ; 
the relative price of high quality cigarettes has declined which offsets the tendency to 
substitute lower quality cigarettes for higher quality cigarettes.      By contrast, a uniform 
ad valorem tax leaves relative price unchanged:   
      2 1 2 1 ( (1 ))/( (1 )) / P t P t P P , 
leading to more substitution away from high priced cigarettes than we would expect to 
see with specific excise taxes.    This observation supports the other two hypotheses 
suggested in the introduction.    First, there is greater price variation under ad valorem 
taxes because specific excise taxes reduce relative prices.    Second, consumption is lower 
under specific excise tax regimes because quality shading is attenuated by the reduction 
in relative prices, which does not occur with ad valorem taxes.   
III. Empirical Specification 
  The goal of the empirical analysis is to obtain estimates of the effects of the cigarette 
excise tax structure on cigarette prices, consumptions, supply and government revenues. 
Specifically, we examine the effects of the tax structure on (a) two cigarette price 
variables, annual average cigarette prices and the price gap between premium and 
low-priced brands; (b) two government revenue variables, government revenues from   7 
excise taxes and the stability of government revenues; (c) two cigarette consumption 
variables, cigarette consumptions per capita and the adult smoking prevalence; and (d) 
one cigarette supply variable, the total cigarette supply. The multivariate regression 
models we used to obtain these estimates are presented in the following sections. 
Cigarette Prices 
  In this section, we illustrate the empirical specifications exploring the effects of the 
tax structure on annual average cigarette prices and the price gap between premium and 
low-priced brands. 
jt jt jt jt t j jt v adv spc X price 2 1   (2.1) 
In equation (2.1), the average cigarette price in Euros in country j year t ( jt price ) 
depends on country fixed effects ) ( j , year fixed effects ) ( t , and time-varying 
country-specific economic characteristics denoted by Xjt, such as measures of cigarette 
market concentration, real GDP per capita in Euros and unemployment rates. The two 
parameters of interest are those associated with specific excise tax rates (spcjt) and ad 
valorem tax rates (advjt). We control for the time-varying country-specific economic 
characteristics because countries in our samples can differ substantially in these 
characteristics that may have significant impacts on cigarette prices and/or excise tax 
rates. Country and year fixed effects are included in most specifications so as to control 
for permanent differences in cigarette prices across these countries and time-varying 
factors that may affect cigarette prices. Equation (2.1) enables us to estimate the effects 
of absolute changes in excise tax rates on average cigarette prices.   8 
  In addition to exploring the impacts of absolute changes in excise tax rates, we also 
adopt an alternative specification to obtain estimates of influences from relative changes 
of the ad valorem tax on the price gap between premium and low-priced brands. 
jt jt jt t j jt v advp X pricegap ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ   (2.2) 
In equation (2.2), the price gap between premium and low-priced brands in percentage in 
country j year t ( jt pricegap ) is determined by the share of the ad valorem tax in the total 
excise tax (advpjt). The share of the ad valorem tax suggests the relative importance of 
the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax. It is also a percentage measurement, which is 
obtained by dividing the ad valorem tax rates over the total excise tax in Euros. 
  Finally, to fully exploit different impacts of the tax structures on the cigarette price 
gap across various market concentrations, we further stretch the specification in equation 
(2.2) into the following, 
jt jt jt jt jt t j jt v HHI advp advp X pricegap 2 1 ) * (   (2.3) 
In equation (2.3), additional to the share of the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax 
(advpjt), we also include the interaction terms of the share of the ad valorem tax with 
cigarette market concentrations ) * ( jt jt HHI advp , which are measured by quartiles of the 
Herfindahl -Hirschman Index (HHIjt). In this case, estimates of  2are able to tell us how 
the effects of the tax structure on the price gap would be affected by cigarette 
manufactures’ market powers. 
Government Excise Tax Revenues   9 
  We also explore the effects of the tax structure on two measures of government 
revenues from excise taxes. One is real government revenues in Euros and the other one 
is the stability of government revenues, which is indicated by the difference in 
government revenues between current and previous years. 
jt jt jt jt t j jt v adv spc X govrev 2 1   (2.4) 
  Equation (2.4) presents the empirical model used for real government revenues 
( jt govrev ).  1and 2in equation (2.4) correspond to the estimated effects of specific and 
ad valorem taxes on government revenues from cigarette excise taxes in Euros. In this 
case, equation (2.4) is almost identical with equation (2.1) and the only exception is the 
dependent variable, where government revenues (govrevjt) are used instead of cigarette 
prices ( jt pricegap ).   
  The specification investigating the effect of the relative importance of the ad valorem 
tax on the government revenue stability ( jt govrevdiff ) is quite different from equation 
(2.2). The assumption here is that increases in the relative importance of the ad valorem 
tax might raise the instability of government revenues, as cigarette manufactures have 
greater potential for abusive “transfer” pricing and cigarette consumers have greater 
potential for “switching down” to cheaper brands in such circumstances.   
However, one concern is that increases in excise tax rates themselves might also raise 
the instability of government revenues, by increasing the differences in government 
revenues between two consecutive years. But such effect of tax changes might be hard to 
detect and thus undermine our estimates, if both ad valorem and specific excise taxes   10 
increase by the same proportion. In other words, it is possible that the stability of 
government revenues might be affected by the changes in tax rates, while the share of the 
ad valorem tax in the total excise tax remains the same.   
jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt t j jt
v advp adv spc
advdiff spcdiff X govrevdiff
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 1 1 1
2 1
  (2.5) 
In order to address this concern, we include additional controls to the specification 
presented, changes in excise tax rates between current and previous years (spcdiffjt and 
advdiffjt) and excise tax rates in the previous year (spcjt-1 and advjt-1). Therefore, in 
equation (2.5), the government revenue stability not only depends on the relative 
importance of the ad valorem tax but also relies on the changes in tax rates and excise tax 
levels in the previous year, although the latter variables are not what we specifically focus 
on in this study. 
  Similarly, to explore potential diverse impacts of the tax structures on the stability of 
government revenues by various market concentrations, the variable of interest, the share 
of the ad valorem tax, is interacted with quartiles of the Herfindahl -Hirschman Index. 
This specification is illustrated in equation (2.6). 
jt jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt t j jt
v HHI advp advp adv spc
advdiff spcdiff X govrevdiff
ˆ ) * ( 2 1 2 1 1 1
2 1
  (2.6) 
 
Cigarette Consumptions and Supply   11 
    This section demonstrates the specifications examining the impacts of the tax 
structure on both cigarette consumption and supply, as these specifications are 
particularly similar and the only differences are the dependent variables. The dependent 
variables involved in these specifications include cigarette consumption per capita, the 
adult smoking prevalence and the total cigarette supply. 
jt jt jt jt t j jt jt jt v adv spc X cigpro smkpre cigcon 2 1 / /   (2.7) 
Equation (2.7) presents the basic specifications adopted for cigarette consumptions and 
supply. In this empirical model, the cigarette consumption per capita (cigconjt), the adult 
smoking prevalence (smkprejt) or the total cigarette supply (cigprojt) in country j year t is 
determined by specific tax rates (spcjt) and ad valorem tax rates (advjt), in addition to 
other factors. 
  Then we take a step further, to investigate the  impacts of specific (spcjt) and ad 
valorem tax rates (advjt) on cigarette consumption per capita (cigconjt), the adult smoking 
prevalence (smkprejt) and the total cigarette supply (cigprojt) by market concentration. 
Similar  as  in  equations  (2.3)  and  (2.6),  the  variables  of  interest  are  interacted  with 
measures of market concentration. But this time, instead of being interacted with the 
share of ad valorem tax, quartiles of the Herfindahl -Hirschman Index are interacted with 
specific  and  ad  valorem  tax  rates.  A  more  detailed  empirical  model  is  specified  in 
equation (2.8). 
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
jt t j jt jt jt
v HHI adv adv HHI spc spc
X cigpro smkpre cigcon
2 2 1 1 ) * ( ) * (
/ /
  (2.8)   12 
 
IV. Data and Measures 
In this section, a detailed description of data resources involved and variables 
constructed for the purpose of the study are presented. The primary sample for the 
empirical analysis was consisted of observations in 21 European Union (EU) countries 
from 1998 to 2007. These data were obtained from various sources.
1  Cigarette tax 
structures and government revenues from cigarette excise taxes came from the European 
Commission. Measures of cigarette prices were obtained from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) and the Tobacco Merchants Association (TMA). Data for cigarette 
consumptions and supply came from the ERC Group PLC. Data for country-specific 
economic conditions were obtained from the World Economic Outlook published by the 
International Monetary Fund (WEO/IMF), and data for market shares of major cigarette 
manufacturers of each corresponding EU country came from the TMA. All the monetary 
measures in local currencies or U.S. dollars were transformed into Euros in real terms by 
using exchange rates and average consumer price indices obtained from the WEO/IMF. 
Detailed summary statistics are presented in the next section. 
Cigarette Tax Structure 
The information on cigarette excise tax structure of these 21 EU countries from 
1998 to 2007 came from the Excise Duty Tables (EDT), which are constructed by the 
                                                 
1  These 21 countries include Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom.   13 
European Commission.
2  These tables were updated at different months of every year. In 
each table, the specific excise tax per 1,000 pieces of cigarettes in Euros, the ad valorem 
excise tax as the percent of the tax inclusive retail selling price (TIRSP) per 1000 pieces 
of cigarettes from the most popular price category (MPPC), and the TIRSP per 1000 
pieces of cigarettes from the MPPC were reported. Since the exact dates of implementing 
tax regulation changes were unavailable, we generated the annual average specific and ad 
valorem excise taxes in Euros for each country in real terms. To measure the relative 
importance of the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax of cigarettes, we also constructed 
the variable, the share of the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax. This variable was 
obtained by dividing the ad valorem tax in Euros by the total excise tax, which is the sum 
of both Specific and ad valorem taxes in Euros (i.e. not including VAT).
3 
Cigarette Prices 
  In this study, we adopted two measures of cigarette prices: annual average prices and 
the price gap between premium and low-priced brands. The former variable came from 
the World Cigarette Guide produced by the TMA, in which the annual average cigarette 
prices in U.S. dollars and in the national currency were reported. Using the exchange 
rates and the average consumer price index obtained from the WEO/IMF, we generated 
                                                 
2  For Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the tax structure data only 
became available after 2003.   
3  Ad valorem tax rates from the EDT were based on the tax inclusive retail selling price (TIRSP) for 1000 pieces of 
cigarettes from the most popular price category. Therefore the ad valorem tax in Euros was obtained by multiplying the 
tax rates with the TIRSP of the cigarettes from the most popular price category.   14 
the real annual average retail price of a pack of 20 cigarettes in Euros for each 
corresponding EU country from 1998-2007.   
In order to explore the effects of the tax structure on the gap in cigarette prices 
between high- and low-priced cigarette brands, the variable, the cigarette price gap, was 
constructed by using cigarette prices of the Marlboro brand (or equivalent) and local 
brands reported by the EIU. The EIU collected these prices information twice a year at 
one or more cities in these 21 EU countries.
4  In each survey, the EIU collected cigarette 
prices from three survey locations according to their survey intensity, low, middle and 
high. All the cigarette prices were reported in local currency units. In this case, we 
constructed the semi-annual average prices of the Marlboro brand (or equivalent) and 
local cigarette brands in local currency units for each country. These price measures were 
obtained as the average prices of three locations within the city if only one city had been 
surveyed in the country, or obtained as population weighted average prices if more than 
one city of the country had been included in the survey. 
We argue that the price of the Marlboro brand (or equivalent brands) is a reasonable 
proxy for that of premium brands, while the price of local brands is also a plausible 
substitute for that of the low-priced brands.
5  The price gap was obtained by taking price 
differences between the Marlboro (or equivalent) brand and the local brands and then 
                                                 
4  From 1998 to 2003, the survey took place in March and September, while the survey was updated in June and 
December from 2004 to 2007. 
5  Among over 97% of our final samples, the prices of Marlboro or equivalent brands are higher or equal to those of 
local brands. Among about 86% of our final samples, the prices of Marlboro or equivalent brands are higher than those 
of local brands. 
   15 
dividing the price difference by the prices of local brands. Therefore the measure of the 
price gap was in percentage measurement, rather than in any monetary units.   
Government Revenues from Cigarette Excise Tax 
Government revenues from the cigarette excise tax of these 21 EU countries also 
came from the EDT tables, which were available from 1998-2007.
6,7  Specifically, we 
derived two revenue variables, real government revenues from the cigarette excise tax in 
Euros and the differences in government revenues between two consecutive years. The 
former one was constructed by using government revenues from the cigarette tax in Euros 
and the average consumer price index of each corresponding EU country obtained from 
the WEO/IMF, while the latter one was obtained by dividing the differences in 
government revenues between current and previous years over the government revenue 
from the cigarettes excise tax in previous year. So the difference in government revenues 
between two consecutive years was also in percentage terms instead of monetary units.   
Cigarette Consumption and Supply 
  The cigarette consumption and supply information used in this study were obtained 
from the World Cigarette Report 2005 presented by ERC Group PLC.
8  From the report, 
we obtained domestic cigarette production, the amount of cigarette imports and exports of 
each corresponding EU country, as well as total cigarette consumption, the cigarette 
                                                 
6  For Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the tax revenue information only 
became available after 2003. 
7  The EDT tables published in sequential years might update the government revenue from cigarettes in previous issues. 
In this case, we always adopted the latest update. 
8  This information was obtained from the part of Europe and the part of Central and Eastern Europe in the Report.   16 
consumption per capita, and the adult smoking prevalence from 1998-2004. Specifically, 
the adult smoking prevalence was based on the population aged 15 and above. Based on 
the information of domestic cigarette production, the amount of cigarette imports and 
exports, we constructed the variable, the total cigarette supply, which was obtained by 
summing up the domestic production and cigarette imports and subtracting exports.   
Market Share Information of Cigarette Manufacturers 
From the World Cigarette Guide, we also obtained the information on market shares 
of cigarette manufacturers of each corresponding EU country from 1998 to 2007. Based 
on the market share information, we constructed the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
so as to control for the potential influence of the market structure on cigarette prices 
and/or the excise tax structure.
9  The HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market 
concentration, which is the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual 
manufacturer (each cigarette manufacturer in our case). The HHI increases either as the 
number of the cigarette manufacturers in the market decreases or as the disparity in sizes 
between those manufacturers increases. Therefore a higher HHI indicates a higher 
concentrated (less competitive) market. We also generated a dichotomous variable for the 
missing HHI, which equals one if twenty percent or more of the total market share had 
not been claimed by any manufacturers in a country. In addition, five HHI indicators 
were constructed as an alternative measure of the market concentration to account for the 
                                                 
9  During the study period 1998-2007, some of EU countries had state-owned tobacco manufacturers (e.g. Italy, 
Portugal, Austria). However it is not clear whether the market-structure in these countries was monopoly or not. 
Consequently, the HHI captures the market concentration- competitive to monopolistic- structure.   17 
non-linear effects of the HHI on cigarette related dependent variables. They represented 
the first quartile (the least concentrated quartile of the market) of the HHI, the second 
quartile, the third quartile, the fourth quartile (the most concentrated quartile of the 
market), and the missing category of the HHI. 
Country-Specific Economic Conditions 
Data for economic conditions of these countries came from the WEO/IMF. From the 
database, we acquired the GDP per capita in U.S. dollars, unemployment rates, and the 
average consumer price index from 1998 to 2007 for these 21 EU countries.
10  Again, the 
GDP per capita in U.S. dollars were converted into real GDP per capita in Euros by using 
the exchange rates and the average consumer price index of each corresponding EU 
country.   
 
V. Results 
In this section, we present our major findings from the empirical analysis. These 
findings are reported in three parts according to the three hypotheses discussed above. In 
the first part, we examine how the cigarette tax structure, specifically the balance between 
ad valorem and specific excise taxes, affect annual average cigarette prices and the price 
gap between premium and low-priced brands. In the second part, we discuss how the 
cigarette tax structure affects government revenues from the excise tax and the stability of 
                                                 
10  Unemployment rates during this time period were not available for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.   18 
the government revenue. In the last part, we present the estimates of the effect of the tax 
structure on cigarette smoking. 
The Tax structure and Cigarette Prices 
This section discusses the empirical findings on the effects of the tax structure on 
annual average cigarette prices and the price gap between premium and low-priced 
brands. In general, the estimates suggest that the greater reliance on the ad valorem 
excise tax leads to lower average cigarette prices and larger price gaps between premium 
and low-priced cigarette brands. In addition, these impacts from the tax structure are 
smaller in more concentrated (less competitive) markets. All these findings are consistent 
with our hypotheses discussed above. The estimates reported in this section are based on 
the annual average prices from the TMA and the cigarette price gaps obtained from the 
EIU.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the final sample used for the average price 
analysis, which suggests that the real annual average prices of these EU countries were 
around 4.5 Euros during our sampling period. Table 2 demonstrates summary statistics of 
the final sample used for the price gap analysis. On average, the cigarette price of 
premium brands was about 20 percent higher than that of low-priced brands. In both 
cases, final samples indicate that EU countries generally rely more on the ad valorem 
cigarette excise tax, rather than the specific tax. In addition, the market of the cigarette 
industry in these EU countries was highly concentrated, with an average HHI of 3,200,   19 
which is much higher than the HHI threshold used in the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
definition of a highly concentrated marketplace.
11 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Annual Average Cigarette Prices Samples 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Real Annual Average Prices in Euros  4.48  2.65 
Real Specific Excise Tax in Euros (1,000 pieces)*  54.87  217.28 
Real ad valorem Excise Tax in Euros (1,000 pieces)*  261.94  3,179.97 
Real GDP per Capita in Euros  28,077.85  12,413.99 
Average Consumer Price Index  110.10  21.29 
Country Population (in millions)  50.07  24.72 
Unemployment Rates**  8.01  2.66 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  3,181.83  1,732.65 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Missing Indicator  0.13  0.33 
n=168 
Notes: Population weighted summary statistics are reported in the table, data are from 1997 to 2008. * The cigarette tax 
structure information is not available from 1997-2002 for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. ** Unemployment rates are not available for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia during this time period. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Cigarette Price Gap Samples 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Cigarette Price Gap in Percentage  19.06  20.11 
Specific Tax as % of Total Excise Tax*  35.77    26.43   
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax*  64.23    26.43   
Real GDP per Capita in Euros  27,547.92    11,624.04   
Average Consumer Price Index  109.09    20.29   
Country Population (in millions)  50.78    24.23   
Unemployment Rates**  8.08    2.69   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  3,264.51    1,666.77   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Missing Indicator  0.10    0.30   
n=281 
Notes: Population weighted summary statistics are reported in the table, data are from 1998 to 2007. * The cigarette tax 
structure information is not available from 1997-2002 for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. ** Unemployment rates are not available for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia during this time period. 
                                                 
11  According to the U.S. Department of Justice, markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are 
considered to be moderately concentrated, and those in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be 
concentrated. Also available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm   20 
 
The primary estimates of the effects of the tax structure on average cigarette prices 
are reported in table 3a and table 3b. In both tables, the estimates in columns 1 and 2 
were obtained with the control of unemployment rates, while the results in columns 3 and 
4 were estimated without the control of unemployment rates. Since unemployment rates 
were always unavailable for 7 EU countries in our sample (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), excluding the control of 
unemployment rates leads to a larger number of observations as indicated in columns 3 
and 4. The linear specification of the HHI and the HHI missing indicator were adopted in 
regression analyses reported in columns 1 and 3, while we relaxed the linear restriction of 
the HHI in regression analyses reported in columns 2 and 4, in which the HHI was 
measured by five dichotomous variables, one for each quartile of the HHI and another 
indicator for the missing category. The real GDP per capita and country fixed effects 
were always included in all regressions. However, year fixed effects were only included 
in regression analyses presented in Table 3a. 
The estimates in Table 3a suggest that the average price of a pack of 20 cigarettes 
would  increase  for  about  0.015-0.02  Euros  if  the  real  specific  excise  tax  per  1,000 
cigarettes increased by 1 Euro and the real ad valorem fell by 1 Euro. That is to say, the 
average price of cigarettes would move at about the same pace as the changes in specific 
excise tax. On the other hand, the estimates also suggest that the increases in the real ad 
valorem tax might lead to lower average prices. These estimates are consistent with the   21 
hypothesis  that  increases  in  the  ad  valorem  tax  are  more  likely  to  lead  to  “transfer” 
pricing.   
Table 3a: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Average Cigarette Prices (I) 
TMA Annual Average Prices 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real Specific Tax  0.012  0.023  0.019  0.021 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Real ad valorem Tax  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  135  135  168  168 
R-squared  0.96  0.97  0.96  0.97 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, and country fixed effects. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
Table 3b: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Average Cigarette Prices (II) 
TMA Annual Average Prices 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real Specific Tax  0.030*  0.037**  0.030*  0.034** 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
Real ad valorem Tax  -0.002*  -0.002**  -0.002*  -0.002** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No 
Observations  135  135  168  168 
R-squared  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.96 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, and country fixed effects. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *0.05<p-value<0.10. 
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Table 4: The Effect of the Tax Structure on the Cigarette Price Gap (I) 
Price Differences between Premium and Low-Price Brands 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax  0.701*  0.536  0.262  0.389 
  (0.347)  (0.308)  (0.275)  (0.268) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  247  247  281  281 
R-squared  0.92  0.92  0.86  0.86 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 




Table 5: The Effect of the Tax Structure on the Cigarette Price Gap (II) 
Price Differences between Premium and Low-Price Brands 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax  1.312  0.394 
  (1.527)  (0.279) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic2  -0.782  -0.064 
  (1.473)  (0.241) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic3  -1.081  -0.032 
  (1.485)  (0.270) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic4  -0.927  0.071 
  (1.431)  (0.262) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic5  -0.900  -0.251 
  (1.461)  (0.280) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  Yes  Yes 
Observations  247  281 
R-squared  0.93  0.87 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per   23 
capita, year and country fixed effects. Hhic1 (the omitted category) represents the first quartile of the HHI (the least 
concentrated market), hhic2, hhic3, and hhic4 are second, third and fourth (the most concentrated market) quartile 
respectively, and hhic5 denotes the HHI missing category. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, 
*0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
The estimates in Table 3a are consistent across all specifications, though they are not 
statistically significant. One possible reason for the insignificance is that the year fixed 
effects caught up all the variation in tax changes. Therefore, for the estimates in Table 3b, 
we  left  out  the  control  of  year  fixed  effects.  The  estimates  in  Table  3b  are  fairly 
consistent with the results in Table 3a and they are all statistically significant. Again, the 
evidence in Table 3b confirms that higher specific excise tax increases average cigarette 
price, while a higher ad valorem tax as a share of the total tax leads to a lower average 
price.   
Table 4 presents the estimates of the effects of the tax structure on the price gap 
between the premium and low-priced cigarette brands. The four specifications in this 
table are very similar to those in Table 3a, and the only difference is the key independent 
variable, the share of the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax was used in this case, 
instead of specific and ad valorem taxes in Euros in Table 3a. This means that we are 
assuming that the specific excise tax falls when the ad valorem tax increases so that the 
total excise tax remains constant. The results in Table 4 provide consistent evidence that 
greater reliance on the ad valorem excise tax leads to a larger price gap between the 
premium and low-priced cigarette brands and this result is consistent with the conclusions 
of  previous  literature.  Specifically,  one  percentage  point  increase  in  the  share  of  ad   24 
valorem tax would raise the price gap by 0.3-0.7 percentage points. This estimate implies 
that a 10-percent raise in the share of ad valorem tax leads to about a 4 to 5 percents 
increase in the price gap, on average.   
To  further  explore  the  impact  of  tax  structure  on  the  price  gap,  we  included 
interaction  terms  of  the  share  of  ad  valorem  tax  and  indicators  of  the  market 
concentration, the HHI categories. The results are reported in Table 5. The hypothesis 
here is that manufacturers in more concentrated (less competitive) markets might benefit 
from their monopoly power on cigarette pricing, and thus their prices are less likely to be 
affected by the increase in the ad valorem tax. The results in Table 5 provide consistent 
evidence to support this hypothesis. Recall that the first quartile of the HHI (hhic1, which 
is the omitted group in Table 5) represents  the most competitive (least concentrated) 
market  and  the  fourth  quartile  of  the  HHI  (hhic4)  represents  the  most  concentrated 
market. Table 5 undoubtedly indicates that the impact of the growth in the share of ad 
valorem tax on the price gap was much smaller in more concentrated markets, suggesting 
that the manufacturers in these markets have the market power to maintain the prices. 
 
The Tax structure and Government Excise Tax Revenues 
This section explores the effect of the tax structure on government revenues from 
cigarette consumption (other than VAT) and the stability of this revenue. Given the 
evidence presented in the previous section that the higher specific cigarette excise tax as a 
share of the total excise tax raises average prices and the higher ad valorem tax as a share   25 
of the total excise leads to a lower average price, it is reasonable to make the hypotheses 
that, (a) the higher specific tax share would lead to higher government revenues from 
cigarettes, while the higher ad valorem tax share might cause a reduction as more 
smokers switch down to less expensive cigarettes that generate less tax revenues; (b) as a 
result, a country relying more on an ad valorem excise tax might experience larger 
variations in government tax revenues from cigarettes as revenues are more subject to 
industry-initiated price changes; (c) when the country has a concentrated cigarette 
market, the variations in the government revenue might be even greater given the greater 
market power of cigarette companies. The evidence presented in this section provides 
supporting evidence for these hypotheses. In addition, the estimates presented in this 
section are consistent with the conclusion in the previous section. The findings presented 
in this section are based on the revenue information provided by the EDT. 
The summary statistics of the final sample used for the investigation are reported in 
Table 6. It indicates that the real annual government tax revenue from the cigarette excise 
tax was about 7 billion, on average, in these 21 EU countries during this time period and 
it increased by about 6 percent per year. 
Table 6: Summary Statistics of Government Revenue Samples 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Real Government Revenues from Cigarette Tax in Euros (in millions)  7,049.23  4,015.91 
Difference in Government Revenues between Current and Previous Years 
(in percentage) 
6.17  22.34 
Real Specific Excise Tax in Euros (1,000 pieces)*  56.57  220.94 
Real ad valorem Excise Tax in Euros (1,000 pieces)*  270.96  3,236.05 
Specific Tax as % of Total Excise Tax*  35.92  26.74   26 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax*  64.08  26.74 
Real GDP per Capita in Euros  28,929.93  11,749.70 
Average Consumer Price Index  107.74  13.76 
Country Population (in millions)  50.98  24.60 
Unemployment Rates**  8.01  2.66 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  3,184.17  1,743.51 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Missing Indicator  0.13  0.34 
n=159 
Notes: Population weighted summary statistics are reported in the table, data are from 1998 to 2007. * The cigarette tax 
structure information is not available from 1997-2002 for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. ** Unemployment rates are not available for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia during this time period. 
 
Table 7: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Government Revenue 
Government Revenues in Euros, Real Term 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real Specific Tax  39.871  39.875  25.116  26.528 
  (65.217)  (63.216)  (53.591)  (52.152) 
Real ad valorem Tax  -2.698  -2.696  -1.703  -1.797 
  (4.411)  (4.277)  (3.625)  (3.529) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  134  134  159  159 
R-squared  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
Table 7 presents the estimates on how changes in the specific and ad valorem excise 
taxes affect government revenues from the cigarette excise tax in Euros. Estimates from 
different specifications are quite consistent, suggesting that increases in the specific tax 
would raise government revenues, while increases in the ad valorem tax might reduce the   27 
revenue. Specifically, a one-Euro increase in the specific excise tax per 1,000 cigarettes 
would raise government revenues by 25-40 million. In other words, on average, a 20% 
increase in the specific excise tax (about 11 Euros) would raise government revenues 
from  cigarette  consumptions  by  4%-6%.  In  contrast,  a  one-Euro  increase  in  the  ad 
valorem  excise  tax  per  1,000  cigarettes  would  reduce  government  revenues  by  2-2.5 
million. That is to say, on average, a 20% increase in the ad valorem excise tax (about 54 
Euros)  would  reduce  government  revenues  from  cigarette  consumption  by  1.5%-2%, 
though none of these estimates are statistically significant. 
The rest of the section focuses on the effect of the tax structure on the stability of 
government revenues and the cigarette tax structure here is represented by the share of 
the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax. The empirical estimates are reported in Tables 
8a, 8b and 9.
12   
Table 8a: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Government Revenue Stability (I) 
Differences in Government Revenues between Current and Previous Years 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax  2.916  2.604*  2.741  2.519 
  (1.815)  (1.395)  (1.801)  (1.427) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Changes in Tax  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tax level in Previous Year  No  No  No  No 
Observations  120  120  138  138 
R-squared  0.32  0.36  0.34  0.38 
                                                 
12  Because of the availability of the exchange rates, additional controls of indicators of tax changes and excise tax 
levels in the previous year are only available from 1999-2007. Therefore, the number of observations in Tables 8a, 8b 
and 9 declines, compared to Table 7.   28 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 




Table 8b: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Government Revenue Stability (II) 
Differences in Government Revenues between Current and Previous Years 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax  2.696**  2.378**  2.595  2.209** 
  (1.141)  (0.809)  (1.491)  (0.949) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Changes in Tax  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tax level in Previous Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  120  120  138  138 
R-squared  0.35  0.39  0.37  0.41 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
 
One concern here is that if ad valorem and specific excise taxes increase by the same 
proportion (in this case, the share of the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax would not 
change  much),  the  increase  in  the  excise  tax  itself  would  raise  the  difference  in  the 
government revenue between two consecutive years. In order to address this concern, we 
included additional controls in the regressions, indicators of tax changes and excise tax 
levels in the previous year. Specifically, the estimates reported in Table 8a were obtained   29 
with the additional controls of tax change indicators, while estimates presented in Table 
8b  and  Table  9  were  obtained  with  all  these  additional  controls,  both  tax  changing 
indicators and baseline tax levels. 
  The results in Table 8a and Table 8b are consistent with our hypothesis. The positive 
association between the importance of the ad valorem tax in the total excise tax and the 
variability of government revenues provides strong evidence that the greater reliance on 
the  ad  valorem  tax  would  lead  to  greater  variations  in  government  revenues  from 
cigarette consumptions.  In most of the specifications, these estimated coefficients  are 
statistically significant. Specifically, if the share of the ad valorem tax in the total excise 
tax rose by one percentage point, the variability of the tax revenue would increase by 
roughly 2.5 percentage points, which corresponds to a 40% change in revenue variation. 
  Similar to what we did in Table 5, we include interaction terms of the share of the ad 
valorem tax and the HHI indicators so as to further explore the heterogeneous effects of 
tax  structures  on  the  stability  of  government  revenues  across  different  market 
concentrations. These results are presented in Table 9. Recalling that the omitted HHI 
indicator, hhic1, represents the quartile of the most competitive markets and the fourth 
indicator, hhic4, stands for the quartile of the most concentrated markets, the positive 
coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that such impacts of tax structures on the 
government revenue stability are  much stronger in more concentrated markets. These 
estimates also imply that cigarette manufacturers with stronger monopoly power would 
have greater ability in manipulating cigarette prices. More importantly, this conclusion is   30 
consistent  with  our  hypothesis  and  the  estimates  in  the  previous  section,  though  the 
estimates in Table 9 are not statistically significant. Considering the magnitudes of the 
estimates are quite large, one possible reason for insignificant estimates is the sample 
size. 
 
Table 9: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Government Revenue Stability (III) 
Differences in Government Revenues between Current and Previous Years 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax  1.240  1.917  1.993  1.827 
  (2.094)  (1.247)  (1.771)  (1.004) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic2  1.355  -0.176  0.337  -0.172 
  (3.042)  (0.135)  (1.686)  (0.109) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic3  2.566  0.953  1.471  0.849 
  (3.066)  (0.755)  (1.273)  (0.761) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic4  1.238  0.223  0.315  0.162 
  (3.035)  (0.256)  (1.644)  (0.211) 
ad valorem Tax as % of Total Excise Tax *hhic5  1.652  0.128  0.715  0.203 
  (3.120)  (0.083)  (1.651)  (0.191) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Changes in Tax  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tax level in Previous Year  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  120  138  120  138 
R-squared  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.47 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. Hhic1 (the omitted category) represents the first quartile of the HHI (the least 
concentrated market), hhic2, hhic3, and hhic4 are second, third and fourth (the most concentrated market) quartile 
respectively, and hhic5 denotes the HHI missing category. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, 
*0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
The Tax structure and Cigarette Smoking   31 
  This section examines how the cigarette tax structure affects cigarette consumption 
and  the total  supply.  Specifically, we  empirically  test  our hypothesis  that  changes  in 
cigarette consumption and/or the total cigarette supply would be smaller under a change 
in the ad valorem excise tax than under a change of the same magnitude in the specific 
excise tax. The underlying rational is that (a) cigarette consumers might have greater 
possibility to “switch down” to low-priced brands when facing the increase of the ad 
valorem excise tax, as these brands are less affected by such tax changes; (b) cigarette 
manufacturers  have  greater  potential  to  “manipulate”  market  prices  when  facing  the 
increase of the ad valorem excise tax so as to minimize the impact of the tax increase and 
(c) the evidence in previous sections of this chapter suggests that this is particularly true 
for those firms  with  monopoly power  in  the market.  Table 10 presents the  summary 
statistics of the final sample used for the empirical investigation, in which the cigarette 
consumption and supply data were obtained from the World Cigarette Report 2005 of the 
ERC Group PLC.   
Table 10: Summary Statistics of Cigarette Consumption and Supply 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Cigarette Consumption Per Capita  1,534.30  491.25 
Adult Smoking Prevalence (Ages 15+) 
†  11.90  5.48 
Total Cigarette Supply (in millions) 
†  83,016.33  41,263.46 
Real Specific Excise Tax in Euros (1,000 pieces)*  58.21  245.93 
Real ad valorem Excise Tax in Euros (1,000 pieces)*  320.75  3,617.21 
Real GDP per Capita in Euros  25,543.12  10,018.57 
Average Consumer Price Index  106.46  16.53 
Country Population (in millions)  50.69  24.56 
Unemployment Rates**  8.19  2.81 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  3,448.34  1,587.57   32 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Missing Indicator  0.06  0.24 
n=126 
Notes: Population weighted summary statistics are reported in the table, data are from 1998 to 2005. * The cigarette tax 
structure information is not available from 1997-2002 for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. ** Unemployment rates are not available for Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia during this time period. † The variable has some missing values. 
 
Unlike other samples, the data on consumption and supply were only available from 
1998 to 2005. We have two measures of cigarette consumptions. One is on the intensive 
margin,  the  cigarette  consumption  per  capita,  and  the  other  one  is  on  the  extensive 
margin, the adult smoking prevalence. The total supply was obtained by summing up the 
domestic production and cigarette imports and subtracting exports. As indicated in Table 
10, the average cigarette consumption per capita in these EU countries was about 1,500 
pieces per year during this time period, which corresponded to 4 cigarettes a day. The 
adult  smoking  prevalence,  which  is  defined  as  the  smoking  prevalence  among  the 
population aged 15 or above, was around 12 percent. The annual average cigarette supply 
among these EU countries was roughly 83,000 million pieces per year, equivalent to 230 
million per day. 
  Table  11  presents  primary  estimates  of  the  effect  of  the  tax  structure  on  the 
consumption per capita, the intensive margin of cigarette consumption. The estimates are 
robust across different specifications and all of them are highly significant at 1 percent 
level.  These  results  suggest  that  the  annual  cigarette  consumption  per  capita  would 
decline by 7-8 pieces, if the real specific excise tax per 1,000 pieces rose by 1 Euro. That   33 
is to say, a 10-Euro increase (a 17% increase) in the specific tax would reduce cigarette 
consumption  by  about  5%.  On  the  other  hand,  the  annual  cigarette  consumption  per 
capita would rise by about one half cigarette, if the real ad valorem excise tax per 1,000 
pieces rose by 1 Euro. The increase in the consumption associated with ad valorem tax 
Table 11: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Cigarette Consumption (I) 
Cigarette Consumption Per Capita 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real Specific Tax  -6.855***  -6.996***  -7.210***  -8.138*** 
  (1.398)  (1.274)  (1.282)  (1.541) 
Real ad valorem Tax  0.463***  0.471***  0.487***  0.548*** 
  (0.094)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.104) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  107  107  126  126 
R-squared  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
Table 12: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Cigarette Consumption (II) 
 
Cigarette Consumption Per Capita 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2) 
Real Specific Tax  -71.845***  -65.612** 
  (19.577)  (18.952) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic2  69.973***  61.862** 
  (19.361)  (17.915) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic3  71.207***  63.603*** 
  (18.768)  (17.474) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic4  58.922**  53.483** 
  (20.950)  (19.383) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic5  70.165***  60.142** 
  (19.706)  (17.667)   34 
Real ad valorem Tax  4.853***  4.431** 
  (1.322)  (1.280) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic2  -9.149***  -6.891*** 
  (2.514)  (1.642) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic3  -10.028***  -8.665*** 
  (2.221)  (2.087) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic4  -24.190***  -15.170*** 
  (2.394)  (2.251) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic5  -19.578***  -18.069*** 
  (3.784)  (4.312) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  Yes  Yes 
Observations  107  126 
R-squared  0.99  0.99 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. Hhic1 (the omitted category) represents the first quartile of the HHI (the least 
concentrated market), hhic2, hhic3, and hhic4 are second, third and fourth (the most concentrated market) quartile 
respectively, and hhic5 denotes the HHI missing category. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, 
*0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
increase might be because smokers have to consume more cigarettes in order to achieve 
the  same  satisfaction,  when  they  “switch  down”  to  low-priced  brands.  However,  the 
magnitudes  of  these  estimates  are  very  small.  A  similar  10-Euro  increase  in  the  ad 
valorem tax would only raise the cigarette consumption by 0.3%.   
Further, Table 12 explores the heterogeneous effects of the tax structure on the 
cigarette consumption per capita across different market concentrations. Again, the 
estimates are statistically significant and robust across different specifications. In the 
most competitive market, the increase in the specific excise tax has the strongest impact 
on the cigarette consumption. Specifically, one Euro increase in the specific tax of 1,000 
pieces would reduce the consumption per capita by 5%. However, such impacts on the   35 
consumption diminish with the increase of the market concentration. This phenomenon is 
consistent with the idea that the burden of a tax increase will be increasingly shared by 
cigarette manufacturers in more concentrated markets. Another potential explanation is 
that the cigarette manufacturers in more concentrated markets might be willing to invest 
more in other mediators, rather than price alone, to moderate the negative impact of tax 
increases on sales, for example spending more on advertisement.   
Similarly, the effect of the ad valorem tax on the cigarette consumption we found in 
Table  11  is  more  pronounced  in  the  most  competitive  market  and  declines  in  more 
concentrated  markets.  Actually,  in  more  concentrated  markets,  increases  in  the  ad 
valorem tax would reduce cigarette consumption at the intensive margin. For example, in 
the most concentrated markets (the last quartile of the HHI), cigarette consumption per 
capita would fall by 0.5-1%, if the ad valorem tax per 1,000 pieces increased by 1 Euro. 
These  estimates  are  consistent  with  our  previous  finding  that  the  price  gap  between 
premium and low-priced brands is much smaller in more concentrated markets, which 
implies that consumers have limited choices in their “switching down” responses. 
Table 13: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Smoking Prevalence (I) 
Adult Smoking Prevalence 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real Specific Tax  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Real ad valorem Tax  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes   36 
Observations  88  88  100  100 
R-squared  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
The estimated effects of the tax structure on adult smoking prevalence are reported in 
Tables 13 and 14. In both tables, the magnitude of these estimated coefficients is tiny and 
all of them are insignificant. The potential reasons might be associated with the facts that 
the sample size is too small and the changes in tax rates during this time period are not 
large enough to generate substantial changes in the smoking prevalence. 
Table 14: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Smoking Prevalence (II) 
 
Adult Smoking Prevalence 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2) 
Real Specific Tax  0.003  0.013 
  (0.050)  (0.042) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic2  0.009  -0.008 
  (0.057)  (0.041) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic3  0.008  -0.008 
  (0.056)  (0.041) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic4  -0.005  -0.013 
  (0.055)  (0.046) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic5  0.011  -0.009 
  (0.059)  (0.040) 
Real ad valorem Tax  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic2  -0.008  -0.003 
  (0.020)  (0.006) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic3  -0.012  -0.007 
  (0.017)  (0.005) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic4  -0.031  -0.023 
  (0.023)  (0.018) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic5  -0.022  -0.014   37 
  (0.019)  (0.008) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  Yes  Yes 
Observations  88  100 
R-squared  1.00  1.00 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. Hhic1 (the omitted category) represents the first quartile of the HHI (the least 
concentrated market), hhic2, hhic3, and hhic4 are second, third and fourth (the most concentrated market) quartile 
respectively, and hhic5 denotes the HHI missing category. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, 
*0.05<p-value<0.10. 
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Table 15: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Cigarette Supply (I) 
Total Cigarette Supply (Production + Imports - Exports) 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real Specific Tax  -598.553*  -532.785  -677.158**  -689.195** 
  (283.141)  (288.738)  (252.636)  (241.302) 
Real ad valorem Tax  40.303*  35.921  45.596**  46.445** 
  (19.097)  (19.488)  (17.047)  (16.289) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  Yes  No  No 
HHI + HHI Missing Indicator  Yes  No  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  91  91  102  102 
R-squared  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.98 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, *0.05<p-value<0.10. 
 
  Tables 15 and 16 demonstrate the effects of the tax structure on the total cigarette 
supply. These estimates are consistent both internally and externally. Internally, the 
estimates are robust across different specifications, while externally, the results presented 
in these two tables are consistent with the findings in cigarette consumption. Specifically, 
increases in the specific excise tax would also reduce total cigarette supply, while the ad 
valorem tax increase might lead to a slight increase in the supply. For example, the 
estimates in Table 15 indicate that the total supply would fall by 7% in general if the 
specific tax per 1,000 pieces increased by 10 Euros, while a 10-Euro increase in the ad 
valorem tax would raise the supply by 0.5%. In both cases, the estimated effect is very 
analogous to our findings in cigarette consumptions. More importantly, Table 16 also 
suggests that the effect of tax increases disappear as the degree of market concentration 
increases. Again the results are consistent with our findings in the consumption in   39 
magnitude. In the most competitive markets (the first quartile of the HHI), one Euro 
increase in the specific tax per 1,000 pieces would reduce the total supply by 5% and a 
same increase in the ad valorem tax would increase the supply by about 0.3%. 
Table 16: The Effect of the Tax Structure on Cigarette Supply (II) 
Total Cigarette Supply (Domestic Production + Imports - Exports) 
COEFFICIENT  (1)  (2) 
Real Specific Tax  -4,211.856**  -3,712.677** 
  (1,162.348)  (1,208.391) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic2  3,871.975**  3,168.270** 
  (1,228.248)  (1,240.577) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic3  3,997.072**  3,283.024** 
  (1,218.787)  (1,223.332) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic4  3,782.351**  3,327.439** 
  (1,295.324)  (1,266.974) 
Real Specific Tax *hhic5  3,731.409**  2,983.934* 
  (1,258.010)  (1,235.337) 
Real ad valorem Tax  284.503**  250.709** 
  (78.515)  (81.639) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic2  -808.237  -414.033 
  (658.362)  (290.363) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic3  -284.145  51.633 
  (547.281)  (161.345) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic4  -621.655  -456.857 
  (398.294)  (244.641) 
Real ad valorem Tax *hhic5  -1,085.119  -654.750 
  (635.932)  (404.613) 
Unemployment Rates  Yes  No 
HHI Indicators  Yes  Yes 
Observations  91  102 
R-squared  0.99  0.99 
Notes: Standard errors assuming that observations are not independent within year are reported in parentheses. All 
models are estimated using country population as analytical weights. All models also include controls of real GDP per 
capita, year and country fixed effects. Hhic1 (the omitted category) represents the first quartile of the HHI (the least 
concentrated market), hhic2, hhic3, and hhic4 are second, third and fourth (the most concentrated market) quartile 
respectively, and hhic5 denotes the HHI missing category. *** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, 
*0.05<p-value<0.10.   40  
VI. Conclusions 
  The main purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence to policy makers on 
the effects of the cigarette excise tax structure on three outcomes: cigarette prices, 
government revenues, and cigarette consumption. Specifically, we examined three 
hypotheses in this study, (a) countries that have greater reliance on ad valorem taxes 
would have a larger price gap between premium and low-priced brands; (b) countries 
with greater reliance on ad valorem taxes would experience greater variability in 
government revenue streams than countries that rely more heavily on specific taxes, and 
finally (c) cigarette consumption would be less affected by an increase in an ad valorem 
excise tax than by a comparable increase in a specific excise tax. In addition, we also 
explored these hypotheses by market concentrations of cigarette industries, as 
manufacturers with strong market power might have substantial influence on the efficacy 
of the tax policy. 
  Empirically, we composed cross-sectional time-series data for 21 EU countries from 
1998 to 2007 from various data sources. Our results are robust across different 
specifications and consistent with our hypotheses. We provide strong evidence that the 
price gap between premium and low-priced brands is larger in countries with a greater 
share of ad valorem tax. A 10-percent raise in the share of ad valorem tax leads to about a 
4 to 5 percent increase in the price gap, with a smaller impact change in more 
concentrated markets. Our estimates confirm that greater instability of government tax 
revenues from cigarette excise taxes can be attributed to greater reliance on the ad   41  
valorem tax and such instability rises with the growth of manufacturers’ market power. 
We also find that greater reliance on a specific tax has greater impact on cigarette 
smoking, but the impact diminishes with the growth of manufacturers’ market power. 
  In sum, we conclude that the specific excise tax on cigarettes, compared to the ad 
valorem tax, is a more efficient policy device to achieve fiscal policy, as well as public 
health objectives. The specific excise tax, however, is more likely to be affected by 
inflation. So regular or automatic adjustment might be necessary. As manufacturers’ 
market power and cigarette consumers’ behavior responses play an important role on the 
efficacy of the regulation, a balanced tax structure on all tobacco products and 
complementary policies to reduce price manipulation would greatly facilitate the 
procedure.     42  
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